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Renewal Revisited:  The Rise and Demise of Large-Scale Housing 
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Introduction 
This paper attempts a broad look at the rise and demise of the large-scale housing 
complexes of the post-war era, based on four case studies in four countries.  While the 
terms and conditions under which each was realized differ, the ensembles were built in 
the same era, designed according to similar principles, and are slated for redevelopment 
for similar reasons.  The case studies are Regent Park in Toronto, the Madden Wells 
Darrow complex in Chicago, the Bijlmermeer in Amsterdam and the Packington Estate in 
London.  Being an abridged version of a longer work, this paper touches only on the 
North American examples. 
 
1. Toronto 
Regent Park, a 69-acre complex of public housing in downtown Toronto, was initiated by 
the City of Toronto in 1947.  When completed a decade later, it comprised 2100 units in 
56 buildings.  As Canada’s first great experiment with public housing, Regent Park was a 
textbook exercise in civic initiative and inter-governmental cooperation.   Like many 
similar ventures, however, the complex slid into decline.  Despite frequent calls for 
upgrades, Regent Park eluded the political radar.  Arguably it made little sense to invest 
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in a complex whose basic tenets and underlying design principles had long been 
discredited. 
 
As the complex neared its 60th anniversary, however, it was no longer possible defer life 
cycle investment.  Real estate activity in the immediate area pointed to a market for 
residential development in what was long considered a marginal area of downtown.  
Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) saw an opportunity to leverage land 
value.  The corporation proposed that the land be cleared and turned over to a developer 
to rebuild.  The vision was to reconstruct the neighborhood at double the density – 
replacing all of the subsidized units and adding an equal number of market-rate units for 
sale.  When the exact value of the land proved to be a point of dispute, a modified 
approach was adopted.  Using its extensive land holdings as equity, TCHC obtained a 
bond rating enabling it to raise funds.  TCHC then re-cast the Request for Proposals as a 
50/50 collaboration with a private-sector developer and increased the target percentage of 
market rate units.  This approach proved more propitious and TCHC formed a partnership 
with Daniels Corporation to redevelop the first of what will be six phases over the next 
decade.  
 
The original Regent Park was conceived as a campus of buildings set in a relatively open 
landscape.  Being markedly different from the neighborhood it replaced, it was to be 
something at which the community could point with pride.  By contrast the redeveloped 
community has been designed to disappear.  Paradoxically the structure of the new 
Regent Park will more closely resemble the neighborhood demolished in the 1940s than 
 3 
the complex it is replacing.  Indeed the degree to which the design of the resurrected 
Regent Park distances itself from the principles expressed in its post-war precursor 
underscores the contempt with which urban clearcutting is now regarded.  The message 
seems virtually self-evident, namely, that reformers were misguided to have so recklessly 
razed the city and that neighborhoods should be put back.   
 
More importantly, the urban principles on which Regent Park was built are widely 
considered to have contributed to its failure – or, at least, to have severely inhibited its 
ability to adapt to change.  The bold new approach taken by modernists made these 
would-be oases unrecognizable as neighborhoods – a phenomenon that alienated 
inhabitants and contributed to anti-social behavior.  There is consensus the relationship 
between buildings must be fixed – as must the relationship between the neighborhood 
and the larger city.  For the second time in fifty years, then, the entire community will be 
erased. 
 
The new Regent Park will be significantly denser when reconstructed.  At build-out, the 
community will have increased from 2083 to 5100 units (of which 1500 will be managed 
by TCHC and 300 will be offered to qualified TCHC tenants for affordable ownership).  
The rent-geared-to-income (RGI) units not being replaced will be built elsewhere in the 
immediate neighborhood.  The overall population of Regent Park will jump by 60%, 
from 7500 to 12,500 and the density will increase from 30 to 74 units per acre (UPA).1  
This increase in density will be offset by a corresponding increase in demographic 
diversity.  
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2.  Chicago 
Support for the redevelopment of large-scale housing estates in the United States 
coalesced in the 1990s under the HOPE VI program, administered through the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  HOPE VI – an acronym for 
“Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere” – evolved from earlier 
revitalization/demonstration grants, largely geared toward transforming single-
demographic housing ensembles into mixed-demographic communities.  Conceived as a 
comprehensive strategy to address an increasingly distressed public housing stock, HOPE 
VI identified high-rise family housing as especially ripe for redevelopment.2 
Aggregations of this kind proved the least sustainable from both a social and economic 
perspective.   Given the fractious political climate under which HOPE VI was conceived, 
however, the program was marketed as a final injection of federal money into a long-
disgraced public housing stock.  In exchange for this last hurrah, local authorities would 
design a way out of the juggernaut to which they’d been consigned, namely, maintaining 
a collapsing housing stock with diminishing support.  Using cleared land as a calling 
card, local authorities could partner with the private sector to explore alternatives.  
 
The history of public housing in North America might be described as the evolution from 
hand up to handout to handover.  What was justified during the Depression as a hand up 
for the temporarily disadvantaged became, by the 1960s, housing of last resort.  The 
average length of stay increased and household incomes dropped.  The decline in rental 
revenue severely compromised local authorities’ ability to maintain the housing.  In 
reaction, vacancy rates increased and rental income dropped further.  
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Despite being managed differently, Toronto Community Housing Corporation’s approach 
to the redevelopment of Regent Park closely parallels the approach for similar 
redevelopments formulated under HOPE VI.  By order of magnitude, however, Chicago 
is undertaking ten times the volume of reconstruction as Toronto3.  With metropolitan 
population equivalent to that of Toronto, CHA has committed to redeveloping all 25,000 
of its occupied units under the current Plan for Transformation.  About 2/3 (or 16,000) of 
these units will be integrated into fourteen mixed-income communities rising on the ashes 
of the most notorious of Chicago’s modernist ghettos. As of 2008, terms of reference had 
been developed for nine of these communities and construction had begun on seven.  
 
Moreover, the 25,000 units in question do not include those that were vacant when the 
Plan for Transformation was approved in the late 1990s.  Taking these into account, 
Chicago Housing Authority will renovate, reinvent or eliminate its entire stock of 40,000 
units in one fell swoop (i.e., within a single decade).  Several factors contribute to the 
decision to do so much so quickly.   The volume of reconstruction reflects to the 
immense volume of units built by the CHA in the post-war period – all of which proved 
difficult to maintain and have reached the end of their life cycle.  It also relates to the fact 
that so much of CHA housing was aggregated into high-concentrated ensembles.  Most 
importantly, it’s a function of the availability of HOPE VI renewal grants.  Without the 
means to properly maintain and the right to sell or otherwise dispose of property acquired 
with federal monies,4 local housing authorities in the US had long been handcuffed.   
HOPE VI presented a window of opportunity, a ‘now-or-never’ exit strategy, and the 
possibility of a wholesale handover.   
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For both Toronto and Chicago, the developer-driven mixed-demographic/mixed tenancy 
community is a new and relatively edgy concept.  But while Regent Park is located in a 
dense, comparatively mixed urban neighborhood in which the redevelopment will be 
effectively more of the same, the Chicago equivalents (with the exception of Cabrini-
Green) are in low-density, largely single-demographic areas with low percentages of 
ownership.  This will affect both the prices that units will be able to command and the 
target demographic.  Whereas, like Regent Park, the for-sale units will be marketed to 
first-time homebuyers, young families are being targeted in Chicago.  And because 
middle-class families with children are notoriously difficult to attract to the city, the 
Chicago developments are targeting African American and Hispanic families.  These 
groups were most closely connected to these areas in the post-war period. 
 
For the purposes of this study, I’ve examined two of the mixed-income developments 
underway in Chicago, namely the ABLA complex on the west side and the Madden 
Wells Darrow complex to the south.   ABLA (an acronym for an aggregation comprising 
the Jane Addams Homes, Robert H. Brooks Homes and Brooks Extension, Loomis 
Courts, and the Grace Abbott Apartments) has been reborn and re-branded as Roosevelt 
Square, a mixed-income, mixed-tenancy community.   Built out over a 30-year period, 
ABLA included everything from PWA walk-ups and wartime housing to high rises adrift 
in open fields.  Like Regent Park, ABLA’s location worked in its favor to the extent that 
it was relatively close to the Loop, convenient to the highway, and adjacent to the campus 
of the University of Illinois at Chicago.  
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At build-out ABLA comprised 3235 units, 66% of which were vacant by the mid-1990s.  
In its reincarnation as Roosevelt Square, the community will include 3147 units.  This 
slight reduction in numbers represents a larger drop in overall population, to the extent 
that market-rate households are smaller than those of subsidized families.   The decrease 
is, of course, relative to ABLA’s heyday in the 1970s, not to its largely abandoned state 
immediately prior to redevelopment.  All of the 1097 subsidized units that were occupied 
pre-demolition will be replaced and 1883 for-sale units will be added – 966 market-rate 
and 917 affordable units. 
 
Like ABLA, Madden Wells Darrow was an aggregation of four separate ensembles:  the 
Ida B. Wells Homes, the Wells Extension, the Clarence Darrow Homes and Madden Park 
Homes. Completed in 1941, the Wells Homes included 1662 units, 868 of which were 
flats in 3-story walkups and 794 of which were row houses.  Wells was the first federally 
funded housing project built exclusively for African Americans.   The Wells Extension 
was added in the mid ‘50s and comprised 641 units in ten, seven-story buildings.  In 1961 
the Clarence Darrow Houses were built. 479 apartments were divided between four, 
fourteen-story buildings.  The last component, the Madden Park Homes, was built in 
1970.  It housed 450 families in ten buildings and was the last large-scale housing 
complex built by the Chicago Housing Authority.  The aggregate Madden Wells Darrow 
complex comprised 3232 units on 92 acres (approximately 35 UPA), 2200 (or 68%) of 
which were occupied when the Plan for Transformation was approved.  It is currently 
being redeveloped as a mixed-demographic community called Oakwood Shores. 
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Given that very little public housing was built in Chicago after the mid 1970s – indeed 
little housing of any kind was built around the core – these new communities were poised 
to appear on a relatively empty stage.  This vacuum, combined with a determination to 
set a more socially and economically sustainable course, demanded a set of design 
guidelines.  As it happens, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) collaborated with Congress of the New Urbanism  (CNU) to formulate these 
guidelines.  In the late 1990s the CNU produced a document entitled “Principles for 
Inner-City Neighborhood Design,” identifying fourteen points to guide the shaping of 
HOPE VI mixed-demographic redevelopments.  
 
New Urbanism coalesced the 1990s as a set of strategies to battle low-density, single-
demographic, automobile-dependent development on the suburban periphery.  Its 
champions formulated the twenty-seven-point Charter of the New Urbanism to fill the 
ideological gap left by the discredited Charter of Athens5 and to re-integrate the 
disciplines of architecture and urban planning.  With this new Charter the New Urbanists 
have endeavored to distill what was best about early 20th century suburbs into a holistic 
and urbane set of principles to guide the development of the contemporary suburban 
periphery.     
 
While buildings associated with New Urbanism are often decried as nostalgic or 
reactionary, something more profound is at play in Chicago.  Eschewing even a passing 
reference to anything modern, buildings fall back on long established, pre-modernist 
Chicago housing types.  It would appear that the goal is not only to put the 
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neighborhoods back, but to pretend that they never disappeared.  That said, Oakwood 
Shores is not an exercise in historical reconstruction.  Not only would this be beyond the 
scope and well beyond the budget of the project at hand but it might make the community 
stand out. 
 
Several observations may be relevant in this regard.  To understand what is at play in 
these mixed-demographic redevelopments we must remind ourselves of the degree to 
which modernism is seen to have stigmatized the poor.  While the middle class fled to the 
suburbs and blue-collar hold-outs in Chicago barred African Americans from their soon-
to-be-abandoned communities, the poor were hustled into towers and conscripted as 
citizens of a brave new world.  As it transpired, housing towers – especially in great 
concentrations – proved particularly ill suited to the demographic they were asked to 
accommodate.   Over time these high-rise projects became increasingly conspicuous – a 
result of their scale, their proximity to major highways, their reputation, and the fact that 
the neighborhoods around them vaporized.  As a consequence virtually every aspect of 
post-war modernism– its planning principles, predilection for towers, and stylistic 
proclivities – has come to symbolize all that is bad about cities.  This is ironic given that 
the goal of modernism was to save the city by reinventing it. 
 
In reaction to the reaction to modernism, Roosevelt Square and Oakwood Shores appear 
to have been designed to avoid any prospect of stigmatization.  The communities not only 
disappear into adjacent neighborhoods but exclude any form, detail, color, material, scale 
or suggestion of intention at which someone might be able to point.  At the same time 
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buildings manage to avoid being so banal as to invite criticism or otherwise attract 
attention.  The communities are compelling studies in disappearance and dissimulation. 
 
Arguably budget constraints for these developments precluded the involvement of well-
known architects (i.e., those a reputation for pushing boundaries).  Indeed, architecture 
was not the point – or at least not the main point.  CNU’s  “Principles for Inner-City 
Neighborhood Design” obviated the need for architects – mitigating both the risk and 
benefit of involving them.  This is in contrast to Regent Park, for which well-publicized 
competitions were held and around which TCHC/Daniels Corporation have worked to 
create a “buzz.”  
 
For the Chicago Housing Authority visibility was tantamount to stigmatization.  The 
lesson of the post-war decades was that public housing should neither stand out nor in 
any way resemble a social experiment.  Ideally CHA housing would not be identifiable, 
whether by its form or by virtue of its isolation.  Stakes were equally high for the private 
sector partners.  Even were the land made available free of charge, negative demand for 
housing in the immediate areas, coupled with the edgy idea of integrating market-rate 
with subsidized units for what were potentially “problem” households, amounted to more 
than enough risk.  The role of the architecture, then, would be to reassure, to draw as little 
attention to itself as possible, to look as snug and familiar as feasible within the 
constraints of the budget.  The driving presumption is that the poor want the same things 
as the middle class, which is notoriously conservative with respect to housing choices.  
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Many of the units in Roosevelt Square and Oakwood Shores are being marketed to 
families with children – for whom a more traditional image of home trumps urban 
edginess and who, like their subsidized counterparts, benefit from living close to the 
ground.  Young families have long gravitated to the suburbs where demographics are 
predictable, schools are superior and house prices lower.   To attract them to the core it is 
necessary to provide a recognizable and compelling vision of community while keeping 
prices down.  This is no mean feat in the best of circumstances; it’s an even greater 
challenge given the diversity of the demographic. 
 
Perhaps the most important point to make in this regard is that Roosevelt Square and 
Oakwood Shores are conceived primarily as fabric.  This may reflect the predominantly 
blighted canvas on which they are appearing.  But while the buildings are unremarkable 
(neither compelling nor offensive), obvious thought and investment have been put into 
infrastructure (crosswalks, sidewalks, iron fences, street plantings, front yards, foundation 
plantings, etc.).  The larger message is that streets – a source of frustration for modernists 
– are more significant than the buildings along them.  The correlate message is that the 
role of architecture is must be reconsidered, that the primary function of buildings is to 
define, connect to, and communicate with the street.  
 
Figures have given way to fabric.   Oakwood Shores and Roosevelt Square have been 
designed to disappear into the city – with the hope that the city will reappear in the 
process. 
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1 Source:  Toronto Community Housing Corporation. 
2 HOPE VI: 
o Includes separate demolition and revitalization grants. 
o Provides funding for acquisition of new sites/properties in order to manage the logistics of 
dismantling large-scale complexes. 
o Relived Housing Authorities of the “one-for-one replacement” rule instituted with the Housing 
Act of 1937. 
o Relaxed some income caps in order to encourage more economically stable tenants to remain in 
housing complexes. 
o Establishes minimum income requirements to control the percentages of severely disadvantaged 
tenants. 
o Provides additional support for Section 8 housing (housing choice) vouchers – with the larger goal 
of de-concentrating poverty. 
o Provides funding for additional social services; attempts to address the problem (poverty) not just 
the symptoms (inability to afford market housing). 
o Helps housing authorities to more effectively deal with management and maintenance of their 
holdings. 
o Permits the transfer of public lands to the private sector to enable housing authorities to partner 
with private-sector developers to build mixed demographic communities. 
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o Includes “Main Street Revitalization” program to permit communities to incorporate affordable 
housing into existing main streets. 
3 Toronto Community Housing Corporation owns and manages 58,500 units (source:  TCHC website, 
2009).  In North America is it second only to New York City as a provider of social housing. 
4 This proscription was written into the Wagner-Stegall Act of 1937 – under which federal money for 
public housing was first provided to municipalities. 
5 The Athens Charter came out of the Congres international d’architecture modern’s (CIAM) Functional 
City Congress  in 1933.  As later documented by Le Corbusier, the Charter laid out a 95-point program for 
the planning and construction of cities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
